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Problem area 
The entry into autorotative flight following loss of power in a 
single-engine helicopter is a time critical event. It requires 
immediate recognition and response by the pilot to avoid the 
rotor speed decaying to a point where the rotor enters an 
unrecoverable stalled condition. Safe entry into autorotative flight 
is therefore dependent on the allowable response time (response 
time available) matching or exceeding the actual (pilot) response 
time. EASA’s future rulemaking is looking to increase the 
allowable pilot response times. 
Description of work 
Ecorys and NLR have carried out a Regulatory Impact Assessment 
(RIA) study, with the aim to support future rulemaking on single- 
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engine helicopters with increased pilot 
intervention times following power failure. 
The specific objective was: “the establishment 
of the case for/against enhancing certification 
requirements in the area of pilot intervention 
time following power failure in single-engine 
helicopters”.  
The study started with a literature search, with 
two objectives: 
1. Establish an optimum or range of pilot 
response times for single-engine 
helicopter loss of power events; 
2. Identify existing or emerging technologies 
that could reduce or delay the loss of 
rotor speed following engine failure to 
increase the allowable response time. 
Next an analysis of the safety impact was 
made in order to quantify the maximum safety 
benefit that could be achieved if safe entry 
into autorotation following engine failure in a 
single-engine helicopter was assured. 
The study then attempted to determine the 
impacts on helicopter design and operation as 
a result of increasing the allowable response 
times. Several technological solutions that can 
increase the allowable response time have 
been investigated. From the simulations that 
have been performed, it is apparent that these  
solutions are capable of increasing the time 
available, but they come with a mass and/or 
cost increase. 
Results and conclusions 
The Regulatory Impact Assessment indicates 
that the policy options to impose mandatory 
requirements to manufacturers to increase the 
allowable response time following engine 
power failure to 2 seconds for all flight phases 
do not show a positive case if the safety 
impacts are compared with the economic, 
environmental and social impacts. The option 
to provide non-mandatory information 
however does provide a positive case. 
Applicability 
The results of the Regulatory Impact 
Assessment can be directly used by EASA to 
support their future rulemaking on single-
engine helicopters. 
The results can also be used to promote 
research in close cooperation with the industry 
in order to try and materialise the significant 
safety benefits that are there, while trying to 
avoid the negative impacts (mass and/or cost) 
as addressed in the study. EASA could for 
example open a Research Program to 
encourage European companies to stay on top 
of global innovation in this area. 
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Summary 
Single-engine helicopter certification requirements for entry into autorotation take into account 
allowable pilot response times of 1 second for cruise and 0.3 second for other flight phases. To 
support EASA’s future rulemaking on increased pilot intervention times following power failure 
on single-engine helicopters, a Regulatory Impact Assessment has been carried out. 
 
First, a literature search indicated that the actual pilot response time to enter into autorotation 
can be up to 3 seconds (for twin-engine helicopters). This response time can be decreased by 
warning cues as well as by active systems that automatically perform the corrective action. There 
are also a number of technological options that can increase the allowable response time, like tip 
jets, a flywheel, an auxiliary turbine or an electric motor. But also passive systems like added tip 
weights or increased rotor speed can increase that time. Against the background of the safety 
impact analysis it is assumed that an increase in available allowable response time to 2 seconds 
for all flight phases will avoid, as a maximum, 80% of the accidents caused by a “late response to 
start autorotation”. 
 
The effect of several technological solutions on the allowable time has been investigated through 
computer simulations. From that it is apparent that these solutions are capable of increasing the 
allowable time, but they come with a mass and/or cost increase, and thus a reduction in payload 
capacity. 
 
The Regulatory Impact Assessment indicates that the policy options to impose mandatory 
requirements to the manufacturers to increase the allowable response time following power 
failure to 2 seconds for all flight phases do not show a positive case if the safety impacts are 
compared with the economic, environmental and social impacts. The option to provide non-
mandatory information however does provide a positive case 
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Abbreviations 
Acronym Description 
CBA Cost Benefit Analysis 
CEA Cost Effectiveness Analysis 
CS Certification Specifications 
EASA European Aviation Safety Agency 
EMPRESS Energy Method for Power Required EStimateS 
EUROPA EUropean ROtorcraft Performance Analysis 
MCA Multi-Criteria Analysis 
MTOM Maximum Take-Off Mass 
RIA Regulatory Impact Assessment 
RMT Rule Making Task 
SME Small and Medium size Enterprises 
SPEAR SPEcification Analysis of Rotorcraft 
VLR Very Light Rotorcraft 
  
 
Definitions 
  
Allowable response time 
(response time available) 
The period between the failure occurring and the pilot having to make an 
input in order that the rotor speed does not fall below its minimum 
transient limit. 
Actual (pilot) response time The combination of the decision time plus the reaction time. 
Decision time The time needed by the pilot to recognise and interpret cues and 
warnings to identify the problem and to decide on the appropriate 
corrective action. 
Reaction time The time taken by the pilot after the decision on the appropriate 
corrective action until commencement of the recovery action. 
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1 Introduction 
Remark 
This report is based on a presentation held at the 7th EASA Rotorcraft Symposium, Cologne, 4-5 
December 2013. The hand-out material for this Symposium is limited to the presented slides, and 
therefore no paper needed to be drafted. To limit the effort required to draft this report, the 
body of the report (chapter 2) only contains a summarized overview of the work carried out, and 
is based on Ref. 2. Chapter 3 provides the conclusions. All slides presented at the Symposium are 
provided in the appendix. 
 
 
2 Overview of the study 
2.1 Study objective 
The entry into autorotative flight following loss of power in a single-engine helicopter is a time 
critical event. It requires immediate recognition and response by the pilot to avoid the rotor 
speed decaying to a point where the rotor enters an unrecoverable stalled condition. Safe entry 
into autorotative flight is therefore dependent on the allowable response time (response time 
available) matching or exceeding the actual (pilot) response time. Normal certification practice 
assumes time delays of 1 second during the cruise phase and 0.3 seconds during all other flight 
phases. EASA’s future rulemaking is looking to increase the allowable pilot response times. 
The presentation describes the Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) to support future rulemaking 
on single-engine helicopters with increased pilot intervention times following power failure. It is 
developed to support EASA in its rulemaking task RMT.0246 (MDM.050), see Ref. 3. The specific 
objective is: “the establishment of the case for/against enhancing certification requirements in 
the area of pilot intervention time following power failure in single-engine helicopters”. The RIA 
has been carried out by Ecorys and NLR. 
 
2.2 Literature study 
The study on which the RIA is based started with a literature search with twin objectives: 
1. Establishing an optimum or range of pilot response times for single-engine helicopter loss of 
power events that was commensurate with known human performance; 
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2. Identifying existing or emerging technologies that could reduce or delay the loss of rotor 
speed following engine failure to increase the allowable response time to the pilot to 
successfully enter autorotation. 
 
From the literature search it can be concluded that the allowable response time depends on the 
type of aircraft and its characteristics (weight, rotor inertia, etc.) but even more on the phase of 
flight. In hover or climbing flight the allowable response time is at its lowest, around 0.3 seconds, 
and in forward flight is increased to in general 3 to 5 seconds. The actual response times found in 
the literature search indicate that the actual pilot response time to enter autorotation can be up 
to 3 seconds (90th-percentile value for twin-engine helicopters). As no actual response times 
were found for single-engine helicopters, this value has been used as an indication for possible 
actual response times for single-engine helicopters. It is however recommended to continue 
research in this field with a focus on single-engine helicopters. 
 
The allowable response time can be increased by active systems such as tip jets, a flywheel, an 
auxiliary turbine or an electric motor. Also passive systems in the form of added tip weights or 
increased rotor speed can increase the allowable response time. The actual response time can be 
decreased by visual or other warning cues provided in advance as well as active systems that 
detect low rotor speed and automatically perform the corrective action. 
 
Based on the outcomes of the literature search it appears that the currently applied normal 
certification practice to assume a 1 second time delay for the cruise phase and 0.3 seconds for 
other flight phases may not be sufficient to adequately embody normal pilot performance. 
Increasing the corrective action time delay for power failure in the certification specification to 
reflect the ability of the 90th-percentile pilot would be desirable. 
 
2.3 Safety impact analysis 
Next an analysis of the safety impact was made in order to quantify the maximum safety benefit 
that could be achieved if safe entry into autorotation following engine failure in a single-engine 
helicopter was assured. For this all accidents with single engine helicopters that occurred in an 
EASA member state during 2000-2011 were collected, totalling 886 accidents. A total of 151 of 
these accidents were related to engine failure, and for 99 it was determined that a successful 
autorotation would have been possible. Analysis of these cases determined that the maximum 
safety benefit that could be expected would be that 20% of all engine failure related accidents 
with single-engine helicopters, in which an autorotation is possible, could be avoided. The 
maximum safety benefit attainable equates to an estimated reduction of approximately 22 
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accidents during the period of 2000-2011 (2 accidents per year), saving the lives of about 13 
people (1 person per year). 
 
2.4 Computer simulations 
The study then attempted to determine the impacts on helicopter design and operation as a 
result of increasing allowable response times to accommodate the range of pilot response times 
established from the literature search. This was determined by performing a (parametric) study 
using a combination of analysis, simulation and engineering judgment. Technologies identified in 
the literature search have then been incorporated in the helicopter design so as to sufficiently 
increase the time available to the pilot to successfully enter autorotation following a (complete) 
power failure. 
 
Several technological solutions that can increase the allowable response time have been 
investigated (adding an emergency power source, increasing the rotating system inertia and 
automatic lowering of collective control). Three computer codes have been used: 
• Energy Method for Power Required EStimateS (EMPRESS), used to assess the impact on 
the steady state flight performance, including power required and fuel consumption; 
• EUropean ROtorcraft Performance Analysis (EUROPA), used to assess the impact of the 
pilot response times and the technologies on the rotor speed decay after power failure 
during various operational conditions; 
• SPEcification Analysis of Rotorcraft (SPEAR), used to assess the impact of selected 
technologies on the helicopter design, including weight penalties; the tool establishes 
feasible helicopter dimensions (expressed in size and mass) based on a set of flight 
performance requirements and a set of operational (mission) profiles. 
 
Computer simulations have been made for four helicopter types of various classes, capturing the 
range of single-engine helicopters: 
• HeliSport CH-7 Kompress (piston engine, MTOM 450 kg); 
• Robinson R44 Raven I (piston engine, MTOM 1089 kg); 
• Bell 206B-3 JetRanger III (turbine engine, MTOM 1452 kg); 
• Aerospatiale AS350B2 Ecureuil (turbine engine, MTOM 2250 kg). 
 
The simulations have been performed for various pilot response times and flight conditions, and 
at maximum take-off mass and instantaneous power failure (worst case situation). From the 
moment of complete power failure to the moment of recovery the rotor speed will drop, and the 
helicopter will roll, pitch and yaw to various degrees. After a delay (the pilot response time) the 
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pilot responds to the engine failure by lowering the collective. The Rotorcraft Flight Manuals for 
the 4 helicopter types under consideration provide values for the minimum power-off rotor 
speed. However, it is to be noted that none of these Flight Manuals provides a value for a 
transient minimum power-off rotor speed, and therefore the minimum power-off rotor speed is 
considered to be the minimum allowable value. The rate of rotor speed decay varies with the 
level of the power required before failure, and will be highest in conditions of high power 
demands (like hover or high speed at high mass). The time to reach the minimum rpm after 
engine failure ranges from 0.5 s for the CH7 to 1.2 s for the AS350B2 
 
Next the likelihood of recovery after a complete power failure at various flight speeds and pilot 
response times has been investigated for the 4 helicopter types. The following definitions are 
used: 
• ‘Likely’ denotes a situation in which recovery is possible with rotor rpm staying within 
limits or temporarily dropping slightly below the limit; 
• ‘Probable’ denotes a situation in which recovery seems to be possible, but in which the 
rotor rpm drops below the minimum allowable value by 5-10%; 
• ‘Unlikely’ denotes a situation in which rotor rpm drops far below the minimum 
allowable rpm, or the fuselage pitch/roll attitudes exceed limitations. 
 
Summarizing the simulation results it is concluded that the following values of pilot response 
times will potentially lead to a safe recovery after a complete power failure (cells labelled ‘likely’ 
and ‘probable’): 
• up to 0.5 seconds in hover for all 4 helicopter types; 
• up to 2 seconds at bucket speed for all types but the B206B3; 
• up to 1 second at cruise speed for all types but the CH7. 
These values are in line with the certification requirements (1 second for cruise phase and 0.3 
seconds for other flight phases). But they are not in line with actual pilot response times. 
Therefore technological solutions will be required to bridge the gap between allowable response 
times and actual response times. 
 
2.5 Technological solutions 
With the conclusions from the simulation results several technological solutions have been 
investigated. These can be grouped in three systems: 
• adding emergency power source; 
• increasing rotating system inertia; 
• automatic lowering of collective control. 
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The objective of implementing these systems is to increase the time available to the pilot to 
successfully enter autorotation following a complete power failure. Simulations have been made 
for various pilot response times and mainly for the hover OGE case (being the most critical flight 
phase). Solutions that will increase the available pilot response time to 2 seconds are deemed 
feasible. This is in line with the British Def Stan 00-970, which stipulates a 2 s delay from any 
flight condition, as did BCAR Section G. From the simulations that have been performed it is 
apparent that these solutions are capable of increasing the time available, but they come with a 
considerable mass and/or cost penalty. Increasing the allowable response time to more than 2 
seconds is not deemed realistic. 
 
2.6 Regulatory Impact Assessment 
The Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) aims at establishing which option would best achieve 
rulemaking objective while simultaneously minimising potential negative impacts. Against the 
background of the safety impact analysis, it is assumed that an increase in time available to 2 
seconds for all flight phases will achieve 80% of the maximum safety benefit available. This 
assumption is based on the fact that on the one hand there remains a shortfall between 
allowable response time and the demonstrated actual response times, and on the other hand the 
types of helicopters under investigation are for a large part flown in an active, hands-on way, 
providing the lower range of actual response times. 
 
Three main policy options were identified for the RIA: 
• Option 0 – “Do nothing scenario”; 
• Option 1 – Mandatory certification of new single-engine helicopter models – Increase 
the allowable response time for pilot intervention following engine power failure, from 1 
second for the cruise phase and 0.3 seconds for other flight phases to 2 seconds for all 
flight phases; This option is split further to variants 1A and 1B representing the 
complexity of the technological solutions that can be applied to achieve this target: 
o Option 1A – Increasing rotating system inertia by placing tip weights on rotor 
blades; 
o Option 1B – Application of auxiliary systems (emergency power supply, 
automatic lowering of collective control). 
• Option 2: - Mandatory certification of new single-engine helicopter models – Increase of 
the allowable response time from 1 second for the cruise phase and 0.3 seconds for all 
other flight phases to above 2 seconds for all flight phases; 
• Option 3: Additional non-mandatory information provided to manufacturers regarding 
the safety benefit gains by increased allowable response times. 
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Option 2 has been excluded from further analysis as this option is not deemed realistic from a 
technological point of view. 
This RIA, affecting the single-engine helicopter sector, considers in particular the following 
assessment criteria (weight values have been assigned to each one): 
• Safety     weight 3; 
• Economics    weight 2; 
• Social      weight 2; 
• Environment     weight 2; 
• Proportionality issues    weight 2; 
• Regulatory harmonisation  weight 1. 
The analysis of the impacts of the options for each of these criteria should be done in line with 
the scale of the issue considered as well as based on the availability of data. Different 
methodologies exist for the execution of a RIA, e.g. a Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), a Cost-
Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) or a Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA). Taking into account the limited 
data available for the single-engine helicopter market as well as the fact that the existing data is a 
mix of quantitative and qualitative information, the MCA was selected for the assessment of the 
proposed options. For the assessment of the effects a standardised rating scale has been used 
(range -5 to +5). To arrive at the final ranking of the options, the standardized scores are 
multiplied by the weights and then summed for each alternative. 
 
2.7 Outcome of RIA 
Option 1A yields a clear positive safety impact. However, the impacts on economic, social, and 
environmental elements are moderately negative. Despite the possible safety gain, the negative 
impact on most of the other impact areas produces an overall slightly negative impact. 
 
Option 1B also yields a clear positive safety impact. However, the economic, social and 
environmental impacts of adopting this policy option were found to be negative. Specifically 
regarding the case of economic impacts, option 1B shows a more negative impact than option 
1A, as the development and price costs have been assessed to be higher for the development of 
those new auxiliary systems. 
 
Option 3 produces a marginal safety benefit. This option also shows a slightly positive impact in 
the social area of impact, which together offsets a slightly negative economic and environmental 
impact. Therefore this is the only option that produces a positive case overall. 
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When comparing the summarized impacts of Options 1A, 1B and 3 it becomes apparent that all 
options show a clear safety benefit combined with a negative economic impact. Next we zoom in 
into the safety and economic impacts, both expressed in costs. The costs of the safety impact are 
due to the costs of prevented accidents, fatalities and injuries. The economic costs are 
dominated by the cost of additional fuel due to the higher mass. The overall costs results clearly 
show that the safety benefits and additional fuel cost figures are by large unbalanced.  
 
The RIA indicates that the policy options to impose mandatory requirements to manufacturers to 
increase the allowable response time following engine power failure (options 1A and 1B) do not 
show a positive case if the safety impacts are compared with the economic, environmental and 
social impacts. The option to provide non-mandatory information (option 3) however does 
provide a positive case. 
 
 
3 Conclusions 
Safety is one of the factors helicopter operators take into account when deciding to invest in a 
single-engine helicopter. It is an important factor, however, it is not the only one. Safety 
measures are likely to influence the sales price and recurring costs of helicopter operation. In 
that sense, any regulation imposed should be very deliberate in addressing economic impacts it 
might cause. 
 
The literature search undertaken in this study indicates that the actual pilot response time to 
enter autorotation can be up to 3 seconds (for twin-engine helicopters), while certification 
requirements take into account an allowable response time of 1 second for cruise and 0.3 second 
for other flight phases. This study has identified a number of technological options that could 
increase the allowable response time available to the pilot. However, the study also indicates 
that these technological solutions could bridge the gap between the actual response time and 
available response time only to some extent and not entirely.  All technological solutions 
examined will lead to weight increases with consequences on helicopter prices. This is likely to 
affect market demand, although this depends on several factors. Nevertheless, against the 
background of the safety impact analysis it is assumed that an increase in allowable response 
time to 2 seconds for all flight phases will avoid, as a maximum, 80% of the accidents caused by a 
“late response to start autorotation”. This leads to annual safety benefits, which are around € 4 
million per year for Europe. While this number is substantial in absolute terms, relative to the 
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total potential safety benefits from addressing all helicopter safety issues, they are relatively 
modest. 
 
Economically speaking, the impact on the recurring costs for operators, stemming from increased 
fuel burn as a result from the option’s weight increase, is also important. Again this increase is 
relatively low in terms of the overall operating costs (as the safety benefits are relatively low 
compared to the overall potential safety benefits from helicopter safety), but the absolute 
increase in recurring costs does seem to outweigh the safety benefits on an annual basis. 
Nevertheless, as successful examples of integrating increased safety standards may come along 
and the supporting technologies are getting more fine-tuned, the case might be that, in the not 
too distant future, conditions may become mature to implement the suggested regulation 
change. 
 
All together, the regulatory impact assessment indicates that the policy options to impose 
mandatory requirements to manufacturers to increase the allowable response time following 
engine power failure to 2 seconds for all flight phases do not show a positive case if the safety 
impacts are compared with the economic, environmental and social impacts. The option to 
provide non-mandatory information however does provide a positive case. 
 
It is recommended to issue a recommendation to the manufacturers of helicopters to increase 
the allowable response time following engine power failure, to 2 seconds for all flight phases. 
 
Furthermore it is recommended to continue research in close cooperation with the industry in 
this area in order to try and materialise the significant safety benefits that are there, while trying 
to avoid the negative impacts (mass and/or cost) as addressed in this study. EASA could for 
example open a Research Program to encourage European companies to stay on top of global 
innovation in this area. 
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Appendix A Presented slides 
 
Slide 1  
Nationaal Lucht- en Ruimtevaartlaboratorium – National Aerospace Laboratory NLR
POWER FAILURES IN SINGLE ENGINE HELICOPTERS:
Establishment of the case for/against enhancing
certification requirements on pilot intervention times
Jos Stevens, NLR Jos.Stevens@nlr.nl
7th EASA Rotorcraft Symposium, Cologne, 4-5 Dec. 2013
 
Slide 2  
2
The reason why
 Entry into autorotative flight following loss of power in 
single-engine helicopters is time-critical event requiring 
immediate recognition and response
 Safe entry into autorotative flight dependent on
 allowable (available) response time
 actual pilot response time
 Normal certification practice assumes time delays of
 1 second in cruise
 0.3 seconds for other flight phases
 EASA’s future rulemaking: increasing pilot intervention 
times following power failure on single-engine helicopters
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Slide 3  
Contents
 Study objective
 Literature study
 Safety impact analysis
 Computer simulations
 Technological solutions
 Regulatory Impact Assessment
 Outcome of RIA
 Conclusions
3
Picture: Nicole Garmston
Source: Sunday Herald Sun
 
Slide 4  
Study objective
 Support EASA’s future rulemaking on increased pilot 
intervention times following power failure on single-
engine helicopters
 Specific objective of study is
 “the establishment of the case for/against enhancing 
certification requirements in the area of pilot intervention 
time following power failure in single-engine helicopters”
 &                  performed Regulatory Impact Assessment
4  
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Slide 5  
Literature study -1-
 Goal to identify
 range of pilot response times (allowable and actual) for 
single-engine helicopter loss of power events
 existing or emerging technologies that could increase time 
available to successfully enter autorotation
 Response times
 depend on rotorcraft type and characteristics (rotor inertia,
weight, etc.), but even more on flight phase
 allowable (available) response time
– 0.3 seconds in hover
– 3 to 5 seconds in forward flight (MTOM > 4300 kg)
 actual response times (90th percentile)
– 2 to 3 seconds (twin-engine helicopters only)
5  
Slide 6  
Literature study -2-
 Identify technologies
 increasing allowable response time
– active technologies
 additional power source
 tip jets
 flywheel
– passive technologies
 additional blade inertia
 increased rotor RPM
 decreasing actual response time
– additional cues (visual, aural, etc.): not beneficial
– advance warnings: may reduce times by 0.5 to 1.4s
– automated system performing corrective action
6  
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Slide 7  
Safety impact analysis
 Quantification of the maximum safety benefit
 NLR dataset of 886 single engine h/c accidents      
(EASA member states, years 2000-2011)
 151 accidents related to engine failure
 for 99 accidents a successful autorotation was deemed 
possible, but landing was unsuccessful
 max. 22 of these (caused by “late response to start 
autorotation”) could have been avoided, saving 13 lives
 increasing time available to 2 seconds (for all flight 
phases) could have avoided 18 of these 22 (80%), 
saving 10 lives
7  
Slide 8  
Computer simulations -1-
 Three NLR computer simulation codes used
 ‘EMPRESS’ for steady state flight performance
 ‘EUROPA’ for engine failure simulations
 ‘SPEAR’ to asses impact of technologies on design/mass
 About 30 single engine helicopter types
 MTOW 450 to 3000 kg
 piston and turbine engine
 Four selected for computer analysis
 HeliSport CH-7 Kompress (450 kg)
 Robinson R44 Raven I (1089 kg)
 Bell 206B-3 JetRanger III (1452 kg)
 Aerospatiale AS350B2 Ecureuil (2250 kg)
8  
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Computer simulations -2-
 Variation of flight conditions
 air speed
 level flight
 climbing flight
 In hover, minimum allowable rotor rpm reached
 CH7 after 0.5 s (min. allowed RPM 90%)
 R44-I after 0.75 s (min. allowed RPM 90%)
 B206B3 after 0.8 s (min. allowed RPM 90%)
 AS350B2 after 1.2 s (min. allowed RPM 82%)
9
 Instantaneous engine failure
 Variation of pilot response 
times after engine failure
 ranging from 0.5s to 4s
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 Likelihood of recovery after complete power failure
 current situation (no changes)
Computer simulations -3-
AS350B2 B206B3 R44-I CH7
Recovery after 
0.5s pilot 
response time
hover OGE likely probable probable probable
bucket speed likely likely likely likely
cruise speed likely probable probable probable
Recovery after
1s pilot
response time
hover OGE probable unlikely unlikely unlikely
bucket speed likely likely likely probable
cruise speed likely probable likely unlikely
climb VBROC probable unlikely unlikely unlikely
Recovery after
2s pilot
response time
hover OGE unlikely unlikely unlikely unlikely
bucket speed likely probable probable probable
cruise speed unlikely unlikely unlikely unlikely
climb VBROC unlikely unlikely unlikely unlikely
10  
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Technological solutions -1-
 Available response time to recover after complete power 
failure very limited
 For 3 out of 4 investigated helicopter types available 
response times ‘meet’ certification requirements
 Actual pilot response times longer than available times
 Technological solutions can improve available times
 Three types investigated
 adding emergency power source
 increasing rotating system inertia
 automatic lowering of collective control
11  
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Technological solutions -2-
 Mass impact of installing solutions allowing 2 second 
pilot response time in hover
12
AS350B2 B206B3 R44-I CH7
Max. take-off mass 2250 kg 1452 kg 1089 kg 450 kg
Installed MCP 466 kW 236 kW 175 kW 73.5 kW
Additional power required to 
keep rotor rpm above minimum 
allowable
120 kW 120 kW 90 kW 39 kW
Total delta mass at equal 
payload and range 95 kg 110 kg 81 kg 50 kg
Increase in rotor inertia 
required to keep rotor rpm 
above minimum allowable
100 % 150 % 150 % 200 %
Total delta mass at equal 
payload and range 94 kg 120 kg 70 kg 41 kg
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Regulatory Impact Assessment -1-
 RIA aims at establishing which option would best 
achieve rulemaking objective while simultaneously 
minimising potential negative impacts
 Four options considered
 Option 0 – “Do nothing scenario”
 Option 1 – Mandatory certification of new single-engine 
h/c’s with allowable response time increased to 2 seconds 
for all flight phases (1A extra inertia, 1B extra power)
 Option 2: - Mandatory certification of new single-engine 
h/c’s with allowable response time increased to above 2 
seconds for all flight phases
 Option 3: Additional non-mandatory information to 
manufacturers w.r.t. safety benefit gains by increasing 
allowable response times (up to 2 seconds)
13  
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Regulatory Impact Assessment -2-
 Items considered for RIA
 Impact assessed through Multi-Criteria Analysis, either 
quantitatively or qualitatively
 Using standardised rating scale for assessment of 
effects (range -5 to +5)
14
Assessment criteria Weight
Safety 3
Economics 2
Social (e.g. employment in Industry) 2
Environment 2
Proportionality issues (proportional throughout Industry) 2
Regulatory harmonisation 1
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Outcome of RIA -1-
 Summary of impacts
 Option 3 ("non-mandatory request to manufacturers") 
produces positive case overall
15
Impact 
assessment area
Weighted 
score
option 1A
Weighted 
score
option 1B
Weighted 
score
option 3
Safety 6 6 3                  
Economic -3.5 -4.5 -1.5
Social -2 -2 1
Environment -2 -2 -1
Proportionality 0 0 0
Regulatory 0 0 0
Total impact -1.5 -2.5 1.5
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Outcome of RIA -2-
 Safety impact
 cost savings due to prevented accidents/fatalities/injuries
 Economic impact (expenditures)
 one-off costs (development, certification, production)
 recurring costs (fuel, training, maintenance, airworthiness)
 others (selling price, market impact)
* assuming 12% market penetration mark
 Safety benefit and fuel cost figures unbalanced
16
Option 1 Option 3*
Safety benefit / year € 3.9 million € 0.47 million                
Additional fuel cost / year € 6.7 million € 0.80 million
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Conclusions
 Certification practice not in line with human performance
 Study proposes to use 2 second time delay for all flight 
phases (in line with Def Stan 00-970)
 Technologies can help, but with mass and cost impact
 Safety and economic cost figures unbalanced (safety 
benefit €3.9M/year, extra fuel costs €6.7M/year) 
 Very few accidents attributed to failure to enter 
autorotation (~2 accidents/year & 1 fatality/year)
Recommend manufacturers to increase
allowable response time to 2 seconds
17  
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Questions?
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
W H A T  I S  N L R ?  
 
The  NL R  i s  a  D utc h o rg an i s at io n th at  i de n t i f i es ,  d ev e lop s  a n d a p pl i es  h i gh -t ech  know l ed g e i n  t he  
aero s pac e sec tor .  Th e NLR ’s  ac t i v i t i es  ar e  soc ia l ly  r e lev an t ,  m ar ke t-or i en ta te d ,  an d co n d uct ed  
no t- for - p ro f i t .  I n  t h i s ,  th e  NL R  s erv e s  to  bo ls te r  th e gove r nm en t ’s  i n nova t iv e  c apa b i l i t ie s ,  w h i l e  
a lso  p romot i ng  t he  i n nova t iv e  a n d com p et i t iv e  ca pa c i t ie s  o f  i t s  p ar tn er  com pa ni e s .  
 
The NLR,  renowned for i ts leading expert ise,  professional  approach and independent consultancy,  is  
staffed by c l ient-orientated personnel who are not only highly ski l led and educated,  but a lso  
continuously  strive to develop and improve their  competencies. The NLR moreover possesses an 
impressive array of  high qual ity research fac i l i t ies. 
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